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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
THE PROPRIETY OF JUDGES ACTING AS WITNESSES
Recent developments have led to a reconsideration of the
problem of members of the judiciary appearing and testifying
as witnesses.' The conflict, in certain types of cases, between
the rights of the accused and the preservation of the dignity
and impartiality of the courts, has given rise to a dilemma
reminiscent of the one posed by King Henry IV2 on a related
aspect of the same basic problem.
It is not at all difficult to visualize a case wherein a judge
cannot seek to preserve the dignity and respect of the courts
by remaining wholly impartial, and at the same time be assured
that justice, in the moral sense, will prevail. On the other
hand, the average case coming within the scope of this subject,
presents no such insoluble problem, or at least the lines of con-
flict are not so sharply drawn. The many ramifications of this
subject, however, will serve to bring into focus the crux of
the controversy.
COMPULSORY PROCESS ON MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
The general policy of the law is that all persons are subject
to compulsory process and that it is the duty of every person
to come forward and disclose the truth when called upon. In
Ex Parte Fernandez the court declared:
Every person in the kingdom, except the sovereign, may be
called upon and is bound to give evidence, to the best of
his knowledge, upon any question of fact material and
relevant to an issue tried in any of the Queen's courts,
unless he can show some exception in his favor.3
Some exceptions have been allowed in the United States in
favor of members of the judiciary in certain limited instances.
The general rule, however, would seem to be that pronounced
by the court in United States v. Caldwell, in which case twojustices failed to answer a subpoena. The court stated:
We pay no respect to persons. The law operates equally
upon all, the high and low, the rich and poor. If we issue
1. See the American Bar Association report of the special committee to
inquire into the propriety of members of the judiciary appearing and testi-
fying as witnesses.
2. The dilemma concerned whether a judge, who was the sole witness to
a murder, could use his personal knowledge to direct a verdict for an
innocent person being tried before him for the crime.
3. 10 C.B.N.S. 3, 29, 142 Eng. Rep. 349, 364 (1861).
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a subpoena to a justice or a judge, and it is not obeyed,
we should be more strict in our proceedings against such
characters, than against others, whose office did not so
strongly point out their duty.4
Other cases have admonished counsel not to call judges as
witnesses if the rights of their clients can otherwise be pro-
tected, but admitted that if summoned a judge cannot refuse to
give his testimony5
A few states have established the rule that a presiding judge
cannot be called as a witness without making proper averments
stating facts showing the necessity of his testimony;" and in
one jurisdiction at least, it is held that the presiding judge, in
a single judge court, cannot be called at all as this would
destroy the court But aside from these few qualifications it
seems to be immutably established that a judge is as com-
pellable a witness as any other person.8
PRIVILEGE OF A JUDGE TO REFUSE TO TESTIFY
One writer9 in discussing certain types of evidence which
is excluded on the grounds of public policy, states that a judge
cannot be called upon to testify to what took place before him
in the trial of another cause. It should be noted that this
involves more nearly a question of privilege than it does of
compulsory process. Even so, the authority supporting such
a statement is meager and unconvincing.
Authority for the proposition that a judge cannot be called
upon to testify to what took place before him in the trial of
another cause is supposedly found in Regina v. Gazard0 and
Agan v. Hey." In the former case a grand jury was investi-
gating an alleged perjury committed before a former grand
jury and they proposed to call the chairman of that session
as a witness. The presiding judge advised against it, stating
that the proposed witness was president of a court of record
and that it would be dangerous to allow such an examination
4. 2 Dall. 333, 334 (U.S. 1795).
5. Woodward v. City of Waterbury, 113 Conn. 457, 155 AtI. 825 (1931).
6. State v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256 Pac. 704 (1927) ; Gray v. Crockett,
35 Kan. 66, 10 Pac. 452 (1886). Contra State v. Sefrit, 82 Wash. 520, 144
Pac. 725 (1914).
7. Crawford v. Hendee, 95 N. J. L. 372, 112 AtI. 668 (1921).
8. 70 C. J. WITNESSES § 15 (1935).
9. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 254c (16ed. 1899).
10. 8 C. and P. 595, 173 Eng. Rep. 633 (1838).
11. 37 N.Y. Sup. Ct. Rep. (30 Hun.) 591 (1883).
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as he might be called upon to state what occurred before him
in court. The grand jury accepted the advice and chose not
to call him. The second case holds that it is error for a judge
to testify as to the grounds upon which he decided a previous
case in a new trial involving the same cause of action.
The aforementioned cases have been used by another author
to justify the statement that the rule at common law was that
communications concerning matters occurring before a judge
are privileged.12  The cases of Welcome v. Batchelder" and
Hale v. Wyatt, 4 which tend to support such a rule, show that
it is not the communication which is privileged, but rather a
personal privilege on the part of the judge. In the first case
the court held that public policy authorizes a judge to excuse
himself from testifying to what witnesses have testified to on
trials before him but that it furnishes no ground of exception
for him to not insist upon his right. In the second case the
appellant Hale sought to probate a will and the appellee called
as a witness the judge of probate who testified to a statement
made by the appellant before the judge in open court in in-
quisition proceedings. The statement was to the effect that
the appellant had expressed the belief that the testator was
insane. On appeal the appellant objected to the competency of
the judge as a witness and made no objection to his testimony.
The court held that it was not incompetent to receive the
testimony of a judge as to what took place before him in a
former trial of a cause, but recognized the rule given in Wel-
come v. Batchelder' that a judge had a privilege not to testify
if he so chose. In speaking of this privilege the court used the
following language:
The privilege accorded to a judge, on the ground of public
policy, that he shall not be required against his will to
give in testimony at the trial of a case a statement made
before him, is a personal privilege of which he may avail
himself or not, as he chooses. Such a statement is not
privileged; it lacks the element of confidentiality which is
essential to a privileged communication."
The public policy argument used to sustain the proposition
that a judge has a privilege hot to testify as to what occurred
12. 1 ELLIOTT, EVIDENCE. § 643 (1904).
13. 23 Me. 85 (1843).
14. 78 N.H. 214, 98 At. 379 (1916).
15. 23 Me. 85 (1843).
16. 78 N.H. 214, 216, 98 Atl. 379, 381 (1916).
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before him in a trial is based upon the fact that it is objection-
able to have the conduct of a judge subject to cross examin-
ation and comment." Such an objection seems both substantial
and justifiable on its face but the fact remains that many
judges do not choose to avail themselves of this privilege and
thereby subject their testimony and conduct to both cross
examination and comment. Under such circumstances, if a
judge chose to exercise such a privilege, it might reasonably be
inferred that the judge felt that he would be unable to justify
what occurred before him in the previous trial of a cause.
At any rate, the rule does not seem to have gained wide-
spread acceptance. In a case involving the privilege of a labor
commissioner to refuse to testify as to what was said before
him in a labor-management dispute, the court said:
While it is stated generally in the textbooks and in some
cases that a judge of a court of record cannot be required
to testify as to matters occurring before him in court the
right does not appear to have often deprived the triers of
the benefit of such knowledge .... If such privilege exists,
it has been honored by breach rather than by observance. 18
The court then held that the labor commissioners had no
such privilege and that whatever privilege existed should be
confined to judges of courts of record, where everything which
they can testify to can properly be proved by others.
It has also been held that it is not error for a judge to
refuse to leave the bench and testify in a cause where his
evidence would be merely cumulative, if he had not been
notified in advance of trial that he would be called, but the
decision does not seem to turn on the point of either compel-
libility or privilege. 9
ADVERSE PARTY STATUTES
A review of the cases would seem to lead to the general con-
clusion that members of the judiciary have no privilege against
testifying, other than those accorded to witnesses in general,
with the possible exception of a judge in regard to a case tried
before him.
17. Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Bd., L.R. 5 H.L. 418 (1872).
18. White Mountain Freezer Co. v. Murphy et al., 78 N.H. 398, 402, 101
Atl. 357, 360 (1917).
19. O'Neill and Hearne v. Bray's Admx., 262 Ky. 377, 90 S.W.2d 353
(1936).
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COMPETENCY OF A JUDGE AS A WITNESS IN CIVIL TRIALS
A. Over which he does not preside:
No case has been found, and there is little reason to believe
that any exist, declaring that a judge is not a competent witness
merely because he is a judge. The general policy of the law, as
mentioned previously, is that every person is under a duty to
come forward and disclose the truth when called upon, and
judges, as a class, are well qualified and competent to perform
this duty. The question of the propriety of a judge voluntarily
offering his testimony is another matter which will be subse-
quently discussed.
B. Over which he presides:
Supervening considerations arise in the case where a judge
is called to testify in a trial over which he is presiding and the
general rule in such a case is well established that under such
circumstances a judge is not a competent witness. The basis
for such a rule is that the office of the judge and witness are
incompatible and not capable of reconciliation. Another major
factor in such a situation is that when the judge takes the witness
stand the court, regardless of intention in so doing, loses the
air of impartiality.
Many jurisdictions allow a juror to take the stand and testify,
and, although the office of juror and witness would seem to be
equally incompatible to that of judge and witness, there are
numerous reasons for drawing a distinction between the two.
Counsel appearing before the Supreme Court of Washington
argued for the analogy, but the court rejected the argument,
saying:
But it seems to us there are many reasons why the judge
should not be allowed to testify that would not weigh in the
case of a juror. If the defendant is entitled to the testimony
of the judge, the plaintiff is equally entitled to his testimony,
and it might eventuate, if this practice were to be tolerated,
that the judge, upon a motion for a non-suit, would be com-
pelled to pass upon the weight of his own testimony; and,
considering the inclination of the human mind to attach
more importance to its own statements than to those of
others, it is easy to see that the rights of litigants might
be prejudiced in such a case. Again, while upon the wit-
ness stand he would have a right to all the protection that
any other witness would have under the law. He could
refuse to answer questions which, in his judgment, might
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
tend to criminate him. He might decline to answer ques-
tions the admissibility of which it would be necesary for the
court to determine, and which would bring him as a witness
in conflict with himself as a court. Again, it would to a
certain extent lead to the embarrassment of the jury, who
are subordinate officers of the court, and under its direc-
tions, to have to weigh the testimony of the judge in the
same scales with the testimony of other witnesses in the
case whose testimony was opposed to that of the judge.
And in many ways it seems to us that this practice would
lead to embarrassment and would have a tendency to lower
the standard of courts, and bring them into contempt.
2 1
The court then goes on to point out that there is no necessity
for such a situation to arise because the law makes liberal pro-
visions for calling in another judge to preside, if a party desires
to avail himself of the testimony of the judge scheduled to hear
the case.
The United States Judicial Code as amended June 26, 1948,
requires any judge or justice to disqualify himself in any case
in which he is or has been a material witness."' This, of course,
only applies to judges in the Federal courts and the states have
not generally adopted a similar provision. On the contrary,
most states which have adopted statutory provisions regarding
the competency of judges as witnesses have been interpreted to
allow a judge both to preside and testify in the same cause.22
Strangely enough this procedure has been most often condoned
in criminal cases shortly to be averted to. No case has been
found upholding the testimony of a judge in a civil action over
which he is presiding, based on a statutory provision. As a
matter of fact the courts have, in the absence of a statute
allowing it, uniformly denounced such a procedure.
In Powers et al. v. Cook et al. -3 the judge refused to disqualify
himself and during the progress of the trial took the witness
stand and gave material and damaging testimony against the
plaintiff's case. On appeal an objection was taken to this and
the court remonstrated the lower court in the following lan-
guage:
The trial judge in this case acted in two capacities, as judge
and witness, passed upon objections to certain portions of
20. Maitland v. Zanga, 14 Wash. 92, 95, 44 Pae. 117, 118 (1896).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948).
22. See footnotes to 6 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 1909 (3d ed. 1940).
23. 48 Okla. 43, 149 Pac. 1121 (1915).
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his testimony, and, after he had finished testifying, returned
to the bench and continued to try the case. To our minds,
this was prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff and funda-
mentally wrong, and, as was stated by Justice Folger, in
the case of People v. Dohring, "because such practice, if
sanctioned, may lead to unseemly and embarrassing results
to the hindering of justice, and to the scandal of the courts."
It tends to lessen the dignity of the courts, and bring it into
disrepute. It is well known to every practicing lawyer that
the testimony of the trial judge, upon a material point, will
outweigh the testimony of ordinary witnesses, and to permit
him to testify gives an undue advantage to the the party
for whom he testifies. It is wrong both in principle and in
morals.24
While it is not always reversible error for a judge to testify
in a civil case over which he is presiding,25 and certainly not if
no objection is made to it,26 it has met with almost unanimous
disapproval.
COMPETENCY OF A JUDGE AS A WITNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
A. Over which he does not preside:
Only one case has been found which fits this category, and it
was there held that the judge, who had presided at a civil trial,
was a competent witness at a subsequent criminal trial involving
an alleged perjury which had been committed during the civil
action.27  No distinction is made in this regard between civil
and criminal actions and the very paucity of cases which have
litigated the point would seem to be mute evidence that, as a
general rule, a judge is as competent and compellable a witness
as any other person.
B. Over which he presides:
1. Cases involving statutory provisions.
The practice of allowing a judge to testify in a criminal trial
over which he is presiding has, by virtue of statutes in a few
states, been sanctioned. The statutes averted to usually make
the judge a competent witness in a trial over which he presides
without regard to whether it is a criminal or civil action. A
signal development of this has been that all of the litigated
24. Id. at 49, 149 Pac. at 1123.
25. Feinstein v. Politz, 103 S.C. 238, 87 S.E. 1005 (1916).
26. In re Elam, 357 Mo. 922, 211 S.W.2d 710 (1948).
27. La Dow v. State, 23 Ohio App. 288, 155 N.E. 502 (1925).
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cases concerning the competency of a judge to testify in a trial
over which he is presiding, by virtue of statutory authority,
have been criminal actions.
In the case of O'Neal v. State2  the defendant introduced
evidence of good character in support of his application for a
suspended sentence. To refute this the district attorney took
the stand and testified that he was acquainted with the defend-
ant's reputation and that it was bad. Following this, the
district attorney called the presiding judge to the stand; he
testified to the same effect. On appeal this was held not to be
error since a statute specifically provided that the trial judge
is a competent witness for either the state or the accused.
A provision of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of
California,2 9 which provides that the presiding judge may be
called by either party, was held to permit the trial judge to
testify, over objections of the defendant, to preliminary mat-
ter2. The court qualified its decision, however, by stating that
it would be deemed an abuse of discretion if the judge's testi-
mony discloses facts without the proof of which the issue such
testimony is designed to support cannot be sustained.
In McCoffrey v. State31 the defendant was being tried for
perjury committed in a former trial. The judge presiding had
also presided at the trial of the civil action during which
the alleged perjury of the defendant occurred. The prosecu-
tion called the judge to the stand and he testified as to the
time and place of the former trial, that he had presided
at that trial and that the defendant has been a witness and
given testimony at that trial. The defendant was convicted
and appealed on the ground that he had been denied a fair
and impartial trial and that the presiding judge was not a
competent witness. The court held that a provision of the
general code to the effect that all persons of sound mind over
ten years of age were competent witnesses precluded the de-
28. 106 Tex. Cr. Rep. 158, 291, S.W. 892 (1927).
29. CAL. CODES Part IV, Tit. 2, c. 3, § 1883 (Deering 1949) states:
"The judge himself, or any juror, may be called as a witness by either
party; but in such case it is in the discretion of the court or judge to
order the trial to be postponed or suspended, and to take place before
another judge or jury."
30. People v. Connors, 77 Cal. App. 438, 246 Pac. 1072 (1926); see also
People v. Madison, 3 Cal.2d 668, 46 P.2d 159 (1935).
31. 105 Ohio St. 508, 138 N.E. 61 (1922).
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fendant from contending that the presiding trial judge was
not a competent witness. Still the court recognized that such
a procedure was dangerous and should not be encouraged, in-
timating that it could be carried too far.
An Arkansas Code provision almost identical with the above
mentioned California Code Section was construed not to be
applicable to criminal cases, the court further saying:
•.. in the interest of the dignity and decorum of the circuit
court and the orderly procedure therein, we feel compelled
to hold that a judge presiding at a criminal trial cannot,
against the objection of the defendant, be sworn and testify
as a witness on the part of the prosecution. 32
It should be added that not only in the interest of the dignity
and decorum of the court, but also in the interests of justice
and fair play, a presiding judge should not be a competent
witness in a criminal trial. A judge or a court is a symbol
of justice largely because of the fact that it is deemed to be
impartial. Anything which detracts from that feeling of im-
partiality is to be deplored because when that is lost, so will the
faith and respect of the people be lost. Even the appearance
of partiality, by a presiding judge, may be enough in itself in
a close case, to remove the last reasonable doubt from the minds
of the jury. It is to be regretted that some courts have been
so easily led away from the salutary effect of the general
common law rule.
2. Cases interpreting the common law:
As was said in Brashier v. State:
It is a tribute to our judicial system that the words and
actions of trial judges have great weight with trial juries.
They observe closely the judge's actions and weigh care-
fully his words and are greatly influenced by what they
think are his reactions. . . . And, while the trial judge
may be very reluctant to take the stand and complies with
the request solely to serve the ends of justice by making
a full disclosure, which unquestionably was the case here,
the greater the character and standing of the judge the
greater the danger of this procedure. It is the supreme
duty of a trial judge, insofar as it is humanly possible, to
hold the scales of justice evenly balanced between the liti-
gants. As a witness, regardless how careful and consci-
entious -he may be, he necessarily takes on the appearance
32. Rogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 29 S.W. 894 (1894).
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of a partisan, endeavoring to uphold by his testimony one
side against the other, and to some extent at least detracts
from the dignity and impartiality of his office. 33
It has been repeatedly held that a proper administration of
the law demands that the courts and judicial officers not only
refrain from actual bias but also from any appearance of bias,34
and that for the presiding judge in a criminal trial to take the
stand and testify tends strongly to influence the jury and
deprive an accused of a fair and impartial trial.33 This,
together with the necessity of public faith and confidence in
the impartial administration of justice, would seem ample
reason for denouncing the practice of allowing a judge to testify
in any case over which he was presiding, much less one of a
criminal nature.36 The common law is strongly opposed to it
and that remains the majority rule today.
THE PROPRIETY OF A JUDGE ACTING AS A WITNESS
As previously brought out, the general policy of the law
requires that every person, when called upon, come forward
and disclose the truth. Moreover, as a general rule, members
of the judiciary are as compellable and competent a witness as
any other person and have only those privileges accorded by
the law to all witnesses in general. Furthermore, the successful
administration of the entire judicial system and the dispensation
of justice depends upon the knowledge and confidence of the
people that the judges and the courts are completely impartial
and free from bias. With these postulates in mind, it remains
to examine the question of how to reconcile these basic concepts
when they come into conflict in a given case.
Perhaps the best example of such a case is a criminal trial
in which the defendant calls upon a member of the judiciary,
to which the case might eventually go on appeal, to testify as
to the defendant's reputation. Diametrically opposed are the
rights of the defendant to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses on his behalf and the duty of the
33. 197 Miss. 237, 242, 20 So.2d 65, 66 (1945).
34. Powers v. Cook, 48 Okla. 43, 149 Pac. 1121 (1915); Maitland v.
Zanga, 14 Wash. 92, 44 Pac. 117 (1896); People v. Silverman, 252 App.
Div. 149, 297 N.Y. Supp. 449 (2d Dep't. 1937).
35. People v. McDermott, 180 Misc. 247, 40 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
36. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1909 (3d ed. 1940) advances arguments
contra.
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courts to remain impartial and free from any conduct which
might be looked upon as taking sides in any justiciable contro-
versy. There is no doubt that this conflict arises because of a
popular misconception of the nature of character evidence. To
those untrained in the law character evidence is naturally
looked upon as the witness' own opinion, whereas according
to legal theory, it is the opinion of the community as a whole.
Nevertheless, the legal profession cannot ignore the fact that
the layman has this misconception and consequently feels that
the judge is siding with the accused. In times of stress this
public misconception of the partiality of our courts could easily
become of critical importance. And this evil is not altogether
eliminated by the fact that the judge must disqualify himself
from hearing the case on appeal.
The issue thus narrows down to which of the two conflicting
interests is paramount, that of the accused or that of the whole
judicial system. The answer seems self-evident. Without the
latter the former would not exist. It would seem, therefore,
that if this conflict arises frequently enough to cause the public
to entertain any doubt as to the integrity of our judicial system,
the rights of the accused must give way.
Of a committee composed of five members of the American
Bar Association which made a report on this subject," three
members agreed that- nothing should be done at the present
time because the problem was not serious enough. Of the three
members, two agreed that if any form of a remedy were
attempted, that it should take the form of legislation, the other
member contending that it should be by a new canon of ethics.
Two of the members, however, considered the problem serious
enough to require immediate attention, one of them favoring
legislation and the other a new canon of ethics for both lawyers
and judges. The author does not feel qualified to pass judgment
on any of the views advanced by that committee, but he takes
the liberty to select the viewpoints which most appealed to
him and to incorporate them with his own.
CONCLUSION
First, rarely should a judge or justice voluntarily appear
and give testimony in any case, especially evidence as to char-
acter and reputation in a criminal trial. Such a voluntary
37. See American Bar Association Report, note 1, supra.
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appearance is certain to be misunderstood by the public and
bring the judicial system into disrepute.
Second, such occurrences have been infrequent and, as yet,
the reputation of the judiciary has not been appreciably affected
thereby. But it is submitted that the time to take action is
before it is so affected, rather than afterwards.
Third, a canon of ethics would not be effective to prevent
the harm from occurring which it would be designed to sup-
press. A new canon directed at the judiciary would still leave
a judge subject to compulsory process. A reciprocal canon
directed at counsel should not deter him from respecting canon
five, i.e., "presenting every defense that the law of the land
allows." Moreover, canon 32 requiring counsel to uphold the
the respect for the judicial office should deter counsel from
calling a judge as a witness merely because he is a judge.
Fourth, legislation exempting a justice or judge from com-
pulsory process would not be in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. 8 The right to have compulsory
process does not give one a right to have the law of evidence
regarding the competency of witnesses or of testimony remain
forever as it now is. Congress is free to legislate regarding
the competency of witnesses or of testimony in accordance with
sound public policy.
Fifth, legislation should be passed prohibiting the testimony
of any justice or judge in any case as to the character or
reputation of any person. The committee of the American
Bar Association unanimously opposed an absolute prohibition
on such testimony. It was felt that the "door should be left
open for such evidence in cases where justice requires."
Perhaps so, but it is difficult to accept the basic premise that
a possible detriment to the rights of an accused in an excep-
tional case is entitled to greater protection than the harm which
might result to the reputation of the judiciary from the giving
of such testimony. Moreover, each case is an exceptional case
to all of those immediately concerned. Furthermore, it is
difficult to visualize such an exceptional case that the testimony
of one person as to the reputation of another would be so vital
38. U. S. CONST. AMEND. VI states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to . .. have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in hiq favor."
39. 70 C.J., WITNESSES § 5 (1935).
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as to result in a miscarriage of justice if it were not allowed.
It would seem that if a person had a reputation in the com-
munity in which he lives that the testimony of one witness,
without considering the personal influence of that witness,
would not be crucial. Admittedly, the testimony of the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, for instance,
would carry greater weight with a jury than that of the
ordinary citizen who had equal knowledge of the defendant's
reputation. The net result, however, of allowing the personal
influence of the witness to be given weight amounts to a per-
version of the legal theory behind its admissibility. This, in
reality, is the basic cause of the problem which needs to be
solved. The problem is not met by allowing it to flare up and
be given widespread publicity in the exceptional case.
Therefore, the author would recommend that the bill now
before Congress H.R. 5671,40 introduced by Representative
Keating of New York, be amended by adding the words "judge
or" and striking out the words "or as to any matter of opinion"
and be passed as so amended. The amended bill would then
read:
No judge or justice of the United States shall testify
as to the character or reputation of any person in any
action in any court of the United States. 1
Ross E. MORRIS
40. H.R. 5671, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. See also H.R. 5623. The American
Bar Association committee criticized the draftsmanship of the Keating bill
because (1) the single word "justice" may be held not to include a judge; (2)
the words "or as to any matter of opinion" are too broad; (3) it was not
clear as to whether the word "action" pertained only to civil actions or
both civil and criminal suits.
41. It is to be noted that the language of this legislation refers only to
the competency of the testimony of a judge in a very limited instance and
does not exempt him from compulsory process. Thus, the advantage of
the testimony of a judge in other instances, in which the advantages may
outweigh the evils, is retained.
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